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Abstract
Once a contract has been agreed by two agents, the problem of renegotiating breach under
two−sided asymmetric information on the agents' outside options is equivalent to the problem
of bilateral trade with uncertain gains. Thus, the theorem of Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983) implies the impossibility of efficient renegotiation. We also show that, assuming no
renegotiation, the optimal breach mechanism in this setting corresponds to the expectation
damage rule.
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Fluctuating market conditions sometimes render existing contractual relationships
ineﬃcient. This note investigates the role of incomplete information in determining
the scope of contracting when eﬃcient contract breach is possible. When long-term
relationships and contracts matter, market mechanisms may not respond eﬃciently
to unfolding circumstances if there is incomplete information.
The setting is as follows. There are two agents who face a prospect of a long-
term relationship that generates a (nonstochastic) surplus.1 The surplus material-
izes if and only if the relationship is maintained throughout the duration. After the
relationship begins, the agents privately learn the (stochastic) values of their out-
side options. On average, each agent’s share of the relationship surplus is greater
than his outside value (and thus pursuing the relationship is ex ante eﬃcient).
But, there is also the possibility that the sum of the outside values turn out to be
greater than the relationship surplus.
First, we ask, assuming that there exists a binding contract, what can be
achieved by renegotiation. We notice that the problem of renegotiating contract
breach here is identical to the problem of bilateral trade with uncertain gains, a
well-studied problem in the Bayesian mechanism design literature. Any eﬃcient
renegotiation process must be interim individually rational because some eﬃcient
breach opportunities will otherwise be lost. Thus, we can directly apply the theo-
rem of Myerson and Satterthwaite [6] (or simply MS) and state the impossibility
of eﬃcient renegotiation.
Much of the established literature on contract theory is based on the premise
that renegotiation can always exploit any ineﬃciency remaining after a contract has
been written. While this may be a reasonable description of a complete information
setting, a simple re-interpretation of the MS result demonstrates that it does not
necessarily apply to an incomplete information setting.2
Second, instead of renegotiation, we consider standard breach mechanisms (that
specify a ﬁxed compensation paid by the breacher) and show that the optimal rule
of such kind under incomplete information corresponds to the expectation damage
rule. This result complements the existing literature on the issue of optimal breach
remedies, which has been mostly concerned with the question of ex ante eﬃciency,
i.e. inducing a correct level of relationship-speciﬁc investment (reliance), when
information is complete (and hence renegotiation is assumed to make the ex post
outcome always eﬃcient). See, among others, Shavell [8], Rogerson [7], Chung [2],
1There is no relationship-speciﬁc investment.
2Hall and Lazear [5] consider a similar problem in the employment context. They show that
many “realistic” employment contracts are written such that when the worker’s outside value
and the ﬁrm’s valuation of the worker are private information, there are too many layoﬀs and
quits.
1Spier and Whiston [9], Edlin and Reichelstein [4], and Edlin [3].
Our results are also related to the work of Aghion and Bolton [1] (and Spier
and Whinston [9]) who consider endogenously determined breach remedies in a
supplier-buyer relationship. Eﬃcient breach is possible as a new supplier enters
the market with a cost advantage, but it is shown that when the future entrant has
some market power the buyer and the incumbent seller will set a socially excessive
level of penalty for breach, thereby reducing the likelihood of entry below the ex
post eﬃcient level.
This note is organized in as follows. In Section 2, we present a model of contract
breach. In Sections 3 and 4, we present the results. Finally, some concluding
discussion is given in Section 5.
2 A Model of Contract Breach
Let us describe a model of contract breach with incomplete information. Consider
a situation in which two (risk-neutral) agents, indexed by i = 1;2, face the oppor-
tunity to engage in a long-term relationship and generate a positive and veriﬁable
surplus of X. At t = 0 the agents must decide whether or not to undertake the re-
lationship whose surplus comes about at some future date t = 2. The distribution
of this surplus is pre-determined. Let xi denote agent i’s share, where x1+x2 = X.
If the agents do not pursue this joint venture from t = 0 through t = 2, the
relationship surplus X does not materialize; instead they get their reservation util-
ities, denoted by r1 and r2 respectively for agents 1 and 2, which are independently
and randomly drawn from the domains [0; ¯ r1] and [0; ¯ r2].
As is the case with the relationship surplus X, these reservation utilities accrue
to the agents at t = 2 if the agents do not pursue the relationship. But, they
privately learn their respective outside values at some time between t = 0 and
t = 2, say, at t = 1. Let fi(¢) and Fi(¢) be the probability density function and
the corresponding cumulative distribution function of agent i’s reservation utility.
We assume that each fi(¢) is strictly continuous and positive on its domain [0; ¯ ri].
Also, let re
i be the expected reservation value of agent i.
We ﬁrst assume that
x1 > r
e
1 and x2 > r
e
2 (1)
Thus, engaging in the relationship is ex ante eﬃcient.
Second, we have
X < ¯ r1 + ¯ r2 (2)
This implies that sometimes ex post eﬃciency entails the agents pursuing their
outside options and obtaining their reservation utilities. The eﬃcient breach rule
calls for the agents to pursue their relationship if X exceeds the sum of their
2reservation utilities r1 + r2 and to pursue their individual outside opportunities
otherwise.
Third, we restrict the analysis to the case in which
x1 ¸ ¯ r1 and x2 < ¯ r2 (3)
Only agent 2 faces the possibility of wanting to breach.
3 Ineﬃcient Renegotiation
Assume that a binding contract is available to protect the relationship. Once writ-
ten, it prohibits the agents from walking out of the relationship. The risk-neutral
agents will want to install such a contract ex ante, but it is ex post ineﬃcient. Let
us now consider what can be achieved by renegotiation between date 1 and date 2.
We shall not impose a particular renegotiation process; rather we shall ask what
can be achieved by any renegotiation process here.
We notice that the renegotiation problem in this setting is identical to the well-
known problem of bilateral trade with incomplete information. Agent 2 may want
to buy himself out of the relationship, but the gains from such trade is uncertain.
After the agents observe their reservation utilities at date 1, their private valuations
of this good, i.e. termination of the contract, are v1 = x1 ¡ r1 and v2 = r2 ¡ x2
respectively for agents 1 and 2. Eﬃciency requires termination of the contract if
and only if v2 > v1 (or r1 + r2 > X).
Deﬁne the intervals on these (random) valuations by v1 2 [vo
1;v0
1] and v2 2
[vo
2;v0
2]. Notice that if r2 < X ¡ ¯ r1 (i.e. v2 < x1 ¡ ¯ r1) and/or r1 < X ¡ ¯ r2 (i.e.
¯ r2 ¡x2 < v1) breach cannot possibly be eﬃcient. Thus, without loss of generality,
let vo
2 = x1 ¡ ¯ r1 and v0
1 = ¯ r2 ¡ x2.3
We draw attention to two critical aspects of the problem. First, any eﬃcient
renegotiation process must be (interim) individually rational; that is, having ob-
served his private information, each agent must always expect to become at least
as well oﬀ from participating in the renegotiation process as not participating and
enforcing the existing contract. Otherwise, in some instances eﬃcient breach op-
portunities will be foregone. Second, the revelation principle dictates that, for any
Bayesian equilibrium of any renegotiation (bargaining) process, there exists an
incentive-compatible direct-revelation mechanism that induces the same outcome.
Thus, in considering the scope of renegotiation in our model, we incur no loss of
generality by restricting attention to the set of direct-revelation mechanisms that
are incentive-compatible and individually rational.
3We can assume, in the spirit of a tie-breaking convention, that agent 1 will never want
to renegotiate unless v1 · ¯ r2 ¡ x2 and similarly agent 2 will never want to renegotiate unless
v2 ¸ x1 ¡ ¯ r2.
3A (direct-revelation) renegotiation mechanism is m = [q(v);t(v)] where v =
(v1;v2) is the agents’ announcements on their valuations of terminating the con-
tract, q(v) is the probability of termination, and t(v) is the transfer from agent
2 (buyer) to agent 1 (seller). Let M denote the set of all such mechanisms. For
notational simplicity, let q ´ q(v) and t ´ t(v).
Given a renegotiation mechanism m = [q;t], let tm
i (vi) be agent i’s expected
payment/receipt from playing the mechanism given vi. Similarly, let qm
i (vi) be the
same agent’s expected probability of trade given vi. We can then deﬁne the agents’
interim expected utilities from participating in m:
U
m
1 (v1) = t
m





2 (v2) = v2q
m
2 (v2) ¡ t
m
2 (v2) :
Thus, given v1 and v2, renegotiation m occurs if and only if
U
m
1 (v1) ¸ 0 and U
m
2 (v2) ¸ 0
The mechanism is individually rational if and only these two inequalities is true
for every v1 2 [vo
1;v0
1] and for every v2 2 [vo
2;v0
2].
A mechanism m = [q;t] is incentive-compatible if and only if we have, for every





1 (v1) ¸ t
m
1 (˜ v1) ¡ v1q
m
1 (˜ v1)





2 (v2) ¸ v2q
m
2 (˜ v2) ¡ t
m
2 (˜ v2) :
Let Mr µ M denote the set of renegotiation mechanisms that are incentive-
compatible and individually rational.
Now, deﬁne q¤ ´ q¤(v1;v2) as
q
¤ = 1 if v1 < v2
= 0 otherwise
We can simply re-state the MS theorem here.
Proposition 1 There exists no m = [q;t] 2 Mr such that q = q¤.







v1 2 [x1 ¡ ¯ r1; ¯ r2 ¡ x2] and
v2 2 [x1 ¡ ¯ r1; ¯ r2 ¡ x2] :
4Since ¯ r1 + ¯ r2 > x1 + x2, we have ¯ r2 ¡ x2 > x1 ¡ ¯ r1. k
This implies that there exists no renegotiation process that will implement the
eﬃcient breach rule in our setting.4
4 Standard Damage Measures
A contract may include a breach mechanism that agent 2 can enforce should he
want to walk out of the relationship after observing the value of his outside option.
This mechanism can in principle be a sophisticated one (a revelation mechanism for
instance), but typically we observe some ﬁxed number, an amount that breacher
can pay the other party to let himself free of the relationship. Let us refer to
this type of simple breach mechanism as standard damage measure that speciﬁes
a number T where T 2 <+.
Sometimes breach mechanisms are not privately stipulated, but rather, court-
imposed. There are three commonly observed types of court-imposed standard
damage measures.
First, expectation damage levies a compensation from the breacher that makes
the non-breacher as well oﬀ as he would have been if the relationship had been
completed. In the present setting, each agent obtains his reservation utility if
the relationship is not pursued. Since the reservation utility is private informa-
tion, expectation damage can be thought of as T = x1 ¡ re
1. Second, speciﬁc
performance forces the relationship to be completed (unless the agents mutually
agree/renegotiate to terminate it before completion). Thus, speciﬁc performance
amounts to a prohibitively large value for T. Third, reliance damage gives the
non-breacher the amount he has spent on reliance, thereby putting him back to
his position prior to the relationship. This applies to the case in which the relation-
ship surplus depends on some ex ante investment. If for instance the non-breacher
incurs an investment cost of e, then reliance damage amounts to T = e.5
Now, let us consider what a standard damage measure can achieve instead
of renegotiation. Clearly, there exists no single value T that will implement the
eﬃcient breach rule. Let us solve for the optimal value of T, that is, the value of
T that maximizes the total ex post surplus.
Agent 2 will pay the amount T and free himself of the contract if and only if
r2 ¡ T ¸ x2. Let ¼(T) be the expected total surplus as a function of T. This
4MS also characterize the mechanism that is interim individually rational and maximizes the
total expected gains from trade. In such a mechanism, there will be too little trade.
5Reliance damage, however, may not be implementable if e is not veriﬁable. When the breach
is occurring, X(e), the relationship surplus which is a function of the investment, will not have













1 + (X ¡ r
e




We want to maximize this with respect to T bounded in the region [0; ¯ r2 ¡x2].
The upper bound comes from the fact that if T is too high it will never be paid.
Let us deﬁne T ¤ = argmax¼(T).
It turns out that the optimal mechanism is the expectation damage.
Proposition 2 T ¤ = min[x1 ¡ re
1; ¯ r2 ¡ x2].










0(T) = (x1 ¡ r
e
1 ¡ T)f2(x2 + T)
and
¼




2(x2 + T) ¡ f2(x2 + T) :
So, setting T ¤ = x1¡re
1 gives the unique (global) maximum since ¼0(x1¡re
1) = 0
and ¼00(x1 ¡ re
1) = ¡f2(x1 ¡ re
1) < 0. (Setting f2(x2 + T ¤) = 0 cannot be another
solution since f2(¢) is strictly positive.) Note that x1 ¡ re
1 > 0 by assumption, so
T ¤ = x1 ¡ re
1 or ¯ r2 ¡ x2 depending on the parameters as in the claim. k
5 Discussion
When eﬃcient contract breach is possible and the values of the agents’ outside
options are private information, we cannot attain the ex post eﬃcient outcome,
that is, terminating the contract and relationship if and only if the sum of the
agents’ reservation utilities exceed the relationship surplus, via any renegotiation
process. We also show that, amongst the standard damage measures, the expec-
tation damage maximizes the total expected surplus.
Having said this, there actually is a case for third-party intervention, perhaps
by the court, to force the eﬃcient outcome using a subsidy. This result is laid out in
MS’s Theorem 3. MS extend their analysis to consider an arbitrator of the direct-
revelation mechanism who can be a net source or sink of money (but cannot own the
6traded object). Consider a breach mechanism with such an arbitrator characterized
by three outcome functions [t1(v);t2(v);q(v)] where t1(v) is the payment from
the arbitrator to agent 1, t2(v) is the payment from agent 2 to the arbitrator,
and q(v) is the probability of contract termination. MS solve for the set of such
mechanisms that are incentive-compatible and individually rational, and show how
much subsidy is required from the arbitrator to implement the eﬃcient outcome.6
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